Illinois Supreme Court Ruling on Concrete Injury Could Limit Consumer Suits, Lawyer Says
A recent Illinois Supreme Court ruling involving the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) could limit consumers’ ability to bring suits in the state for violations without harm, said Saul Ewing lawyer Brian Willet in a blog post Tuesday.
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In the case, Fausett v. Walgreens, a consumer filed a class-action complaint alleging Walgreens’ practice of issuing receipts with more than just the last five digits of the credit card used in a transaction violated the FCRA. According to the blog, the lower courts said this claim satisfied requirements for standing to bring the case.
But the state supreme court, on the other hand, found that because the FCRA didn’t explicitly say who could bring suits for violations, the plaintiffs had to prove concrete injury. And because the consumers only alleged harms like increased risk of identity theft, they failed to meet the standing requirements, as the claims didn’t constitute actual harm.
This decision follows a trend of courts viewing standing more stringently and requiring concrete harms. The California Invasion of Privacy Act (CIPA) case Price v. Converse carried this theory (see 2510270015), and the case Khamooshi v. Politico took it even further by ruling the sensitive personal information transmitted must be embarrassing or invasive to constitute a CIPA violation (see 2510240042). The 9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar conclusion in August in Popa v. Microsoft Corporation (see 2508270052).
Though the case “appears straightforward,” Willet said, “Illinois distinguishes between common-law standing and statutory standing to determine whether a plaintiff may pursue relief,” and the high court found common-law standing applied here.
“The record was clear that the plaintiff did not suffer any concrete harm,” as “she conceded a lack of awareness of any harm to her credit or identity and did not know of anyone outside of herself, the cashier, and her attorneys who might have seen the receipt,” the lawyer said.
Willet noted this decision “aligns with the outcome that would have occurred had the action been litigated in federal court, where a concrete and particularized injury is required to satisfy the Article III standing requirements.”
The lawyer warned the case may have meaning beyond future FCRA cases, since “many other consumer rights statutes … contain language similar to that of the FCRA.” He added: “If these arguments gain traction, the era of no-injury consumer class actions in Illinois could head toward an end.”